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Abstract: In questo articolo suggerisco di riflet-
tere sull’improvvisazione per comprendere la cre-
atività artistica. Infatti, lungi dall’avere una natura 
anti-artistica, a causa di una sua presunta impre-
parazione, inaccuratezza, monotona ripetitività, si 
può sostenere che l’improvvisazione esemplifichi 
la creatività artistica.
Spiegherò la relazione tra l’improvvisazione 
e la creatività artistica in quattro passaggi. 
Anzitutto discuterò il concetto di creatività, in 
generale (I) e in rapporto all’arte (II). Quindi 
metterò a fuoco le proprietà e la fenomenologia 
dell’improvvisazione (III). Infine spiegherò per-
ché l’improvvisazione può essere intesa come 
istanza esemplificatrice della creatività artistica 
(IV). 
Parole chiave: improvvisazione, creatività, 
filosofia dell’arte, seguire una regola, valore artis-
tico, esemplarità e originalità.
Abstract: In this paper I suggest that we look 
to improvisation in order to understand artistic 
creativity. Indeed, instead of being anti-artistic 
in nature, due to its supposed unpreparedness, 
inaccuracy, and repetitive monotony, 
improvisation in art exemplifies and ‘fuels’ 
artistic creativity as such.
I elucidate the relationship between improvisation 
and artistic creativity in four steps. I discuss 
the concept of creativity in general (I) and in 
reference to art (II). Then I focus on the properties 
and the phenomenology of improvisation (III). 
Finally, I explain why improvisation can be 
understood as an exemplifying instance of art 
creativity (IV).
Keywords: Improvisation, Creativity, 
Philosophy of Art, Rule-following, Artistic Value, 
Exemplarity & Originality. 
I. Creativity and rules 
It is often stressed that creativity is vital for human survival and flourishing. Creative 
actions enable human beings to cope with their natural and social environment, to solve 
problems by inventing efficient and valuable solutions that were unforeseeable before their 
application. Creative behaviour is the hallmark of intelligent life. We value it specially 
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because it expresses ‘reflective freedom’, which is the capacity to find the ‘right’ way to act 
in a specific situation and/or to step back from a previously followed action routine.1 In this 
sense creativity is not a prerogative of art. Anyway, as we will see, in the arts creativity is 
shown in a very special way. The importance of art in human life relies to a great extent on 
the way art experience is a product, a display, and a vehicle of creativity.2
Berys Gaut defines creativity as «the capacity to produce original and valuable items 
by flair».3 It does seem appropriated to term something as creative, in case it is judged as 
being original (i.e. the first in comparison with other actions or objects), as having value 
– because it offers a solution to a problem4 and has valuable effects (thus it can be held as 
exemplary5) –, and as being done with flair – because the production process is not carried 
on in a mechanical or in a purely random way and requires skill.6 
The issue is nonetheless controversial. Explanations of this kind cannot provide the 
grounds or the causes that result in sufficient conditions for an act to be creative. There 
are indeed no recipes or sets of instructions for the attainment of creative achievements, 
because an outcome is creative only if it cannot be completely traced to previous conditions. 
Otherwise it would be predictable, not new and not creative.7 This amounts to saying that 
an explanation of creativity consisting in providing sufficient conditions for a creative 
achievement would eliminate creativity.8
As a matter of fact, Gaut’s criteria for creativity (originality, value, flair) do not enable one 
to be creative. They offer no recipes for creativity. They will at most allow to classifying (in 
retrospect) certain actions as creative. In other words, they serve as conceptual clarification 
of actions and the products thereof that one can judge as original, valuable and accomplished 
with flair, after they have been made.9 Due to the positive value usually assigned on these 
properties, this amounts to saying that ‘creative’ is a term often used as a criterion of value 
(or merit) of actions and the products thereof.10 In this «evaluation-added way», it is often 
1 Cf. B. Gaut: «Creativity and Skill», in: M. Krausz, D. Dutton & K. Bardsley (eds.): The Idea of Creativity (= 
IC), Leiden – Boston, Brill, 2009, pp. 83-103.
2 See the papers included in: A. Bertinetto, A. Martinengo (eds.): Re-thinking Creativity. Creativity between 
Art and Philosophy (special issue of Tropos, anno IV, n° 2/2011) and A. Bertinetto, A. Martinengo (eds.): Re-
thinking Creativity. Histories and Theories (special issue of Tropos, anno V, n° 1/2012 (forthcoming)).
3 B. Gaut: «Philosophy of Creativity», Philosophy Compass, n° 5/12, 2012, p. 1041. 
4 Cf. L. Briskman: «Creative Product and Creative Process in Science and Art», in: IC, pp. 17-41, here p. 32.
5 Cf. Gaut: «Creativity and Skill», pp. 83-4; Cf. C. R. Hausman: «Criteria of Creativity», in: IC, p. 11.
6 Gaut: «Creativity and Skill», p. 86. Gaut says «purely» because he wants «to allow a role of serendipity in cre-
ation». Still, he adds, an accidental production must be the outcome of a «skillful exploitation of chance, rather 
than chance alone», in order to be creative.
7 Cfr. Hausman: «Criteria of Creativity», p. 10.
8 J. Maitland («Creativity», Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, n° 34, 1976, pp. 397-409) terms this the 
paradox of creativity». Cf. also Briskman: «Creative Product and Creative Process», pp. 19-20.
9 D. Novitz: «Explanation of Creativity», in: B. Gaut and P. Livingston (eds.): The Creation of Art, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 174-91, here p. 177.
10 «To adjudge something to be ‘creative’ (...) is to bestow upon it an honorific title, to claim that it deserves to be 
highly valued (…)» (Briskman: «Creative Product and Creative Process», p. 17). Hence, creativity seems to be 
a kind of those concepts that Sibley called «evaluation-added property terms», that is, terms, like ‘tasty’ and 
‘insipid’, that, «when they are applied to something, not only is a property being attributed to it but an indication 
is being given that the speaker has a favourable or unfavourable attitude to that property». F. Sibley: «Particularity, 
Art, and Evaluation», in: F. Sibley: Approach to Aesthetics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007, p. 92.
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used as a normative concept rather than as a descriptive one. A normative concept expresses 
a norm, i.e. it says what we have to do for a certain aim. Hence, an action or its outcome 
is judged as creative, if it is subject to the norm of creativity, i.e. if it has the (in Sibley’s 
words)11 «merit-constituting properties» of being original, valuable and skilfully made and, 
for this reasons, is regarded as an exemplar that other actions and products thereof should 
follow (I will come back to this issue in § II in reference to art). 
Yet the determinate properties that are responsible for an action or an achievement 
being creative,12 cannot be predicted in advance or generalized: they vary from case to case. 
Empirically, creative acts are realised and performed in an indefinitely multitude of different 
ways: there is no mechanism, «no one set of action-guiding principles, responsible for all of 
them».13 For this reason, a creative outcome is something unexpected and unforeseen, which 
is positively valued because it is skilfully achieved in spite of the risks of failure and has 
valuable effects of some kind. Although it can result from a long and accurate preparation, 
it has something surprising. Because of this, I will argue, creativity is intrinsically linked 
to improvisation. 
Creative acts certainly depart from formulaic rules, i.e. from rigid recipes as to how 
accomplish a certain task. Otherwise the outcome would be predictable and not creative. 
This does not imply that they do not follow rules. In turn, following rules does not 
preclude creativity. An action can be described as an application of rules and nevertheless 
be understood as creative from a normative perspective, games of chess being a classical 
(Wittgensteinian) example.14 Chess players certainly follow the constitutive and the regulative 
rules of chess, i.e. the rules that constitute and define a game as chess and not, for instance, 
as draughts («a bishop moves along the diagonals of the board») and the rules that regulate 
special aspects of chess («when a player touches a piece, he must move this piece»). Still 
their moves are all the more efficacious, if they do not slavishly follow the basic manual 
constitutive and regulative rules as well as the general principles and maxims for a good 
game of chess («develop all your chess pieces, not just pawns, as quickly as possible»), 
but are able to ‘read’ the specific situation of the game, so as to choose, from the range of 
the allowed moves, not only one that is generally recommended, but the one which, in the 
specific case, is (or turns out to be) the ‘right’ one.15 The ‘right’, or successful, move is the 
one which, in the context of the specific game, makes things difficult for the contender, 
because he/she cannot anticipate, and counter, it, by means of following general principles. 
Because of its departing from more standard and expectable moves, the move at issue is a 
risky attempt. Still, if it proves successful, it shows that taking some (more or less calculated) 
11 Ibid., p. 94.
12 Sibley calls them: «merit-responsible properties».
13 Cf. Novitz: «Explanation of Creativity», p. 178.
14 Cf. L. Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell, 1953, § 197.
15 I have combined John Searle’s distinction between «constitutive» and «regulative» rules, which David Novitz 
relates to the question of artistic creativity (see D. Novitz: «Rules, Creativity and Pictures», in: P. Lewis Alder-
shot (ed.): Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy, Ashgate, 2003, pp. 55-72, here p. 57), and Stanley Cavell’s 
articulation of rules in «rules as defining», «rules as regulating», «principles», and «maxims» (S. Cavell: «Rules 
and Reasons», in: S. Cavell: The Claim of Reason, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, pp. 293-312, here p. 305).
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risk is inherent to creative activities, due to the fact that creative activities are not governed 
by rigid routines, even though they follow rules.16 
We have seen that judging an action or an object as creative has a positive normative 
‘flavour’, because it means to appraise their special merit as new, exemplary valuable and 
accomplished with flair. Well, a chess move can be termed creative, if it displays (more 
or less context-relative) originality, exemplary effectiveness (‘Wow! This is how to play 
chess!’), and skill (elegance, time/energy-saving, willingness/ability to take risks). So it 
may be suggested that creativity has to do with the application of rules. Yet, the question 
arises as to how the relation between the rule and the act of following and applying the rule 
in the present case can and should be understood if the act is (to be) evaluated as creative. 
Chomsky’s distinction between rule-based creativity and rule-changing creativity is here 
paramount.17 
1. According to the first kind of creativity, an almost infinite number of new outcomes 
can result from a finite set of rules: an almost indefinite number of chess moves can 
result from the rules of chess.
2. According to the second kind of creativity the accumulation of individual deviations 
from the rules can result in the generation of new rules. Therefore a routines-governed 
practice can be transformed in another routines-governed practice, due to the violation 
of one (or more) of the practice constituting rules, as epitomized by the (apocryphal?) 
story of the guy, who invented Rugby by picking up a football and running with it 
in the hands. Once a community acknowledged this action as the instance of a new 
rule, a new game was invented. A new game was instituted by means of violating the 
routines of an old game and establishing, in this way, new routines.18
The interesting thing is that in human practices these kinds of creativity are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather intertwined. 
1) In human practices the application of a rule presupposes the rule, but it is not explained 
on the basis of that rule alone.19 The understanding and execution of a rule in a process that is 
governed by the rule is not itself governed by the rule. It amounts to saying that following the 
rule can require training of skills or insights as to how comply with the rule’s requirements, 
because the way a rule is applied in practical life cannot be determined by the rule itself 
and can vary from case to case. The way the constraints established by a rule is empirically 
followed cannot be set by the rule: the pertinence of the general rule to the single case cannot 
be generally established, but it is invented in every single occurrence of the rule. As Gilbert 
Ryle once observed, in thinking, speaking, acting, the general rule is applied «to just the 
present once-only situation».20 Or, to put it in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s terms: in a general 
sense, no rule can govern its execution, because the application of the rule is guided by acts 
16 See Gaut: «Creativity and Skill», p. 102. I will come back to the role of risk in creative and improvisational 
behavior in the following sections of the paper.
17 Cf. N. Chomsky: Current issues in linguistic theory, The Hague, Mouton, 1964. Chomsky’s distinction is 
adopted by E. Garroni: Creatività, Macerata, Quodlibet, 2010. See D. Cecchi: «Stato d’eccezione e creatività. 
Riflessioni a partire da Carl Schmitt e Emilio Garroni», in: A. Bertinetto, A. Martinengo (eds.): Re-thinking 
Creativity. Histories and Theories, pp. 75-90.
18 Cf. Gaut: «Creativity and Skill», p. 101.
19 Cf. Garroni: Creatività, p. 106.
20 G. Ryle: «Improvisation», Mind, New Series N° 85, 1976, p. 77.
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of interpretation in every case.21 Though the room for freedom in applying the rule varies 
to a great degree in the different spheres of human life as well as in every single case, and 
sometimes it is very limited, every single case is a new one and requires specific treatment. 
This allows for the possibility of multiple realizability of the rule in the single case and 
some of the ways the rule is accomplished can be creative. Yet the rule cannot determine 
the creative qualities of its applications. Therefore, the creativity of an action that follows 
the action’s rules is surprising, unforeseeable, and unexpected.
2) From this ensues that the application of the rule might result in a transformation of 
the rule. The application can change the rule to various degrees and for different reasons. 
Applications of a rule may lead up to modify or change the rule, in order to solve problems 
generated by the rule in a concrete circumstance or to cope with previously unconsidered 
issues and goals. In this sense, for instance, normative laws are slightly modified, transformed 
or radically changed because they do not work anymore in the right way. Yet, applications 
of rules can produce a modification of the rule just for experimenting with new practices (as 
in the case of the invention of rugby). This amounts to saying that the free deviation from 
the rule can result in a new rule. In human practices rule-governed creativity presupposes 
the principle possibility of rule-changing and rule-establishing creativity.22
As a matter of fact, rules giving norms for practical life arise in practical life and 
are established by inventive practices. In Robert Brandom’s words: «[...] the capacity of 
individuals to produce novel performances in accord with a set of social practices makes 
possible novel social practices as well. For as the community becomes capable of novel 
responses (themselves subject to judgements of appropriateness), new social practices are 
generated.»23 Rules are generated and established in the praxis. As famously stated by 
Wittgenstein, we «make up the rules as we go along».24 In this sense creative processes are 
consistent with the common way human practices unfold.
Obviously, not every application of a rule changes the rule. Otherwise, we would just 
have no rules. For example, at first blush it would be odd to say that every use of a natural 
language changes its rules, because in such a situation persons could hardly understand 
21 In Truth and Method (1960; Eng. Transl. New York: Seabury Press, 1975: Part II, Ch. II, § 2b) H.-G. Gadamer 
draws the Aristotelian concept of phronesis to the Kantian concept of reflexive judgment in order to explain that 
the application of a rule or a law requires an interpretational act, which adapts the rule to the single case. The 
outcome of this is the variation of the rule, which can be ‘inventive’ in different degrees. To put it differently, the 
application of the rule suspends, or at least may suspend, the rule (see Cecchi: «Stato d’eccezione e creatività»).
22 Ibid., p. 124. According to M. Boden («Creativity: How Does It Work?», in: IC, pp. 240-242) three kinds 
of psychological creativity can be distinguished: combinational, exploratory and transformational creativity. 
Combinational creativity works by generating «unfamiliar (and interesting) combination of familiar ideas». 
Exploratory creativity uses «the existing stylistic rules or conventions (…) to generate novel structures (ideas), 
whose possibility may or may not have been realized before the exploration took place». Transformational 
creativity is a kind of exploratory creativity, in which the transformation of rules and conventions is more 
radical. On my opinion, combinational, exploratory and transformational creativity can be conceived as the 
psychological processes that lead to change the rules to the extent that new rules can be invented.
23 R. Brandom: «Freedom and Constraint by Norms», American Philosophical Quarterly n° 16, 1979, p. 179. Cf. 
G. Bertram: «Kreativität und Normativität», in: G. Abel (ed.): Kreativität, pp. 273-283; G. Bertram: «Impro-
visation und Normativität», in: G. Brandstetter, H.-F. Bormann, A. Matzke (eds.): Improvisieren, Bielefeld, 
Transcript, 2010, pp. 21-40.
24 Cf. Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, § 83.
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each other and the used words would hardly count as a language in the common sense of 
‘language’. Nonetheless, languages do not work (exclusively) like mechanical routines. We 
are more or less creative using them. Intentional creative uses of language, like in poetry as 
well as in everyday life, exploit, in different ways and to different degrees, the possibility 
to follow linguistic rules in ways that depart from more ordinary and standard uses and 
may even disrupt them. Non-standard uses of languages that violate and/or subvert old ones 
are risky enterprises and they must often pay the price of incomprehension. Yet new uses, 
if and when acknowledged by linguistic communities, may become rules. For example, a 
metaphorical use of a word can establish itself as a secondary meaning of the word.
However, not every transformation of a practice or every unexpected or new application 
of a rule is creative in the aforementioned normative sense. In a creative process the 
application of the rule requires skill, cleverness, insight. In this case skills are not determined 
by rules or routines, but they help to apply the rule in efficacious and previously unexpected 
ways (like in the considered case of the ‘right’ move in a game of chess). Creativity requires 
not only novelty, but also value and flair. It is the result of experiential backgrounds, inspired 
spontaneity and a capacity for experimental exploration.25 Moreover, only in rare cases 
the innovative move is inter-subjectively acknowledged in retrospect by a community and 
becomes exemplary of new actions and practices.
II. Creativity in art
All that I explained above is certainly not an exclusive prerogative of art but an important 
feature of human rational action in general. In any event, it is ordinarily stressed that art is 
a practice, i.e. a sphere of life in which creativity is particularly important. Indeed, artistic 
creativity can be regarded as a paradigmatic exemplification of creativity tout court.26 
Artworks show creativity at work and epitomize the problem of applying the notion of rule 
to creativity.
In general, we can say that what is specific to artistic creativity and what distinguishes 
for example artistic from scientific creativity is that in arts creativity is referred to artistic 
practices and their history, is about the relationship between artistic media, materials, 
procedures and structures, is strictly connected with the pleasures of imagination,27 elicits 
aesthetic experiences. So, although the psychological and cognitive processes that are 
responsible for artistic creativity may not differ from the ones that are responsible for other 
kinds of creativity, in particular from scientific creativity, and although the precise definition 
of artistic creativity may encounter the same difficulties as those met by the definition of 
25 Cf. Gaut: «Creativity and Skill», p. 94. As Jerrold Levinson says, «Creativity […] is sometimes a matter or 
reconceiving or reinterpreting or reconstruing given constraints, and not always a matter of either remaining 
inventively within them or entirely abandoning them.» J. Levinson: «Elster on Artistic Creativity», in Levinson: 
Contemplating Art, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006, p. 74.
26 Following Gaut («Creativity and Imagination», p. 284), I mean by «paradigm» and «paradigmatic exemplifica-
tion» «something to which we can fruitfully appeal in order to understand the phenomenon in question, or an 
aspect of that phenomenon. A paradigm in this sense is a heuristic notion, its application helping us better to 
understand the relevant phenomenon.»
27 The link between creativity and imagination is explored in Gaut: «Creativity and Imagination».
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art and of aesthetic experience,28 this does not block the possibility of regarding artistic 
creativity as a specific kind of creativity. One may even argue that art is a special field for 
exercising and implementing creativity, because in art creativity can be practiced for its own 
sake, i.e. for the sake of experiencing and of letting others experience the possibilities of 
human creativity, and not for other aims and purposes, as occurs, for example, in the case 
of scientific creativity. Hence artistic creativity is paradigmatic of creativity as such.
Like other kinds of creativity, creative artistic production requires not only rule-governed 
creativity. It requires the rule-changing and rule-generating creativity as well. Clearly, there 
always are formal and material constraints (traditional conventions, aesthetic styles, cultural 
backgrounds, technical problems and solutions) that govern the practice of producing a 
certain artwork (for example, constraints that govern whether a work belongs to an artistic 
category, a genre, a style etc.). However, the way to cope with and answer to the constraints 
is free, to the extent that the constraints may also be overstepped by and in their application. 
In other words, these constraints are not entirely rigid, for artists can revolutionize the 
artistic category, the genre, etc. in valuable ways.29 As D. Novitz observed, «the artist’s 
understanding of the significance of the rule allows for their alteration, and sometimes their 
radical transformation, in ways that need not afflict the trained sensibilities of their viewers, 
that can find social acceptance, or alternatively, that can deliberately cultivate shock and 
surprise».30 So artists work within conventions and rules, while at the same time modifying 
them in and through their artworks: the way conventions are applied reshapes those 
conventions, which might thus be described as continuously in progress.31 In this sense art 
28 I have dealt with these questions in A. Bertinetto: «Arte como desrealización», Daimon, Revista de Filosofía, 
nº 39, 2006, pp. 175-185 (eng. version: «Art as derealization», in Imaginacija, čutnost in umetnost / Zbornik 
referatov III. sredozemskega kongresa za estetiko «Proceedings of the III. Mediterranean Aesthetik Kongress», 
2007, pp. 22-27) and in A. Bertinetto: «Aesthetic Distance in the Performing Arts», in: I. Álvarez, F. Pérez-
Carreño y H. J. Pérez (eds.): Expression in the Performing Arts, Cambridge, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2010, pp. 218-234. I discussed the specific problems of the art of music in A. Bertinetto: Il pensiero dei suoni, 
Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2012.
29 Some of these ways are the ‘hybrid art forms’, which through juxtaposition, synthesis and transformation 
combine traditional art forms, inventing new ones out of them. According to Jerrold Levinson, hybrid art forms 
«tend to be symbols of creativity itself», because «to create is typically to reorganize and recombine pre-existing 
materials into unprecedented wholes. The hybridization of art forms does precisely this, not at the level of 
single works and their components, but at the level of artistic categories and their antecedents». J. Levinson: 
«Hybrid Art Forms», in J. Levinson: Music, Art and Metaphysics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 34.
30 Novitz: «Rules, Creativity and Pictures», p. 61.
31 Cf. B. E. Benson: The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
The idea of art as historical practice is defended by N. Carroll (in: Beyond Aesthetics Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2001; see in particular the chapters: «Art and Interaction», pp. 5-20 and «Art, Practice, and 
Narrative», pp. 63-75). Carroll rightly explains 1. that «one mark of a practice is that participants be able to 
self-consciously identify themselves as participating within the practice», and 2. that the practices of art evolve, 
develop and change by means of integrating the past and the present. Hence, if the practice changes, as the art 
practices change, the participants must «have the means to self-consciously identify themselves as partaking of 
the same practice through change and transition» (Carroll: Beyond Aesthetics, p. 67). However, while underly-
ing the continuity of the historical practices of art, Carroll seems to diminish the innovative potential of art. In 
doing so, he does not a good service to the understanding of art as a dynamical reflective practice, due to which 
each artwork, every time it is perceived and interpreted, lets us understand ourselves and the world in specific 
and (potentially) surprising ways (for this notion see D. M. Feige: «Art as reflective practice», in: A. Bertinetto, 
F. Dorsch, C.Todd (eds.): Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, 2010, pp. 125-142). Moreover, 
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production shows the dialectical links between the kinds of creativity just considered: artists 
interact with the members of their cultural communities (whose scope can be extended to 
mankind as a whole) and work by using in innovative ways sets of culturally and creatively 
established norms that rule their practice; the ways they follow those norms can lead to 
changes in those norms; the new norms will govern the ways other artists will work and so 
on in an on-going inter-subjective (dialogical, collaborative, competitive) task.
Hence a tension between constraints and freedom from constraints is at work in the case 
of the production of the single artwork as well in its appreciation by means of the faculty 
of aesthetic judgement. According to a ‘Kantian’ way of considering beautiful art, «a work 
of art must not be produced in accordance with certain rules, but must itself be a rule».32 
An artwork is a rule, because it is normatively exemplary for further art, and in at least two 
senses. 
1) The rule embodied in the artwork is exemplary because it introduces a new artistic 
model, by means of skilfully exemplifying the way a (relatively) new work technique, 
or form, achieves valuable artistic results. Outstanding pioneer artworks, which 
initially are often disdained and condemned by public and critics, transform the 
conventions of art because they are the historically first items of an artistic genre, 
practice, or style; they are revolutionary artworks that become paradigmatic. They 
are creative because they transform old rules and generate new ones. They are cases 
of rule-changing creativity.
 Claude Monet’s L’impression, soleil levant (1872) is one of these exemplary artworks: 
somebody considers it as the first impressionistic painting and for the sake of the 
argument I will consider it as such.33 It may be considered the model of the new genre 
of painting called «Impressionism», because it establishes a rule which is discernible 
in it – for example the rule expressed in Éduard Manet’s precept: «One must be of 
one’s time and paint what one sees».34 As such, it became a model that embodies a 
rule, which has ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ applications. Renoir’s The Seine at Asnieres 
(1878) is a correct application of the impressionistic canon. Conversely, who takes 
Giorgio De Chirico’s L’enigma di un pomeriggio d’autunno (1910) as instance of 
impressionistic painting, is making a mistake. It is rather the model of another rule, 
the rule of the ‘metaphysical painting’, that speculates on realities unobtainable to 
explicit depiction.
2) The rule established in a successful, creative artwork is exemplary in a further, 
more general, sense. It is an example of creativity itself. An artwork, that slavishly 
imitate a creative artwork, having the same empirical «merit-responsible properties» 
is not a creative outcome. As imitation, it may certainly be appreciated for some 
Carroll links the notion of art as historical practice with criticism toward the notion of aesthetic experience. As 
I argued elsewhere (Bertinetto: «Arte como desrealización»; eng. version: «Art as derealization») this criticism 
is based on a too restricted conception of aesthetic experience. Anyway, here I will not purse this matter further.
32 P. Guyer: «Exemplary Originality: Genius, Universality, and Individuality», in: The Creation of Art, p. 126.
33 It is probably not, to say the truth, the first impressionistic painting, but it was the first impressionistic painting 
to be exhibited (in 1874) and it gave Impressionism its name.
34 É. Manet, in: W. Vaughan and Ch. Ackroyd (eds.): Encyclopedia of Artists (2000), Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, p. 28.
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of its qualities. It can be a very good imitation, but it cannot be appreciated as 
creative. The rule followed by two production processes that lead to different creative 
artworks is rather the same rule only in the general sense that both artworks share 
the same «merit-constituent properties» (originality, skill, value), which jointly are 
the normative conditions of a creative achievement.35 Hence, an artwork B (say 
the Renoir) can adhere to the canon set by A (say Monet’s Impression) and still be 
creative, if the empirical routines that were responsible for the production of both 
artworks differ, but their merit-constituent properties (originality, skill, value) are the 
same, although, maybe, to different degrees. The criterion for evaluating B as creative 
is not the way it adheres to the canon set by A, but rather the special, unforeseeable 
way it applies this canon in the particular case. In this sense, even if the Renoir does 
not introduce a new artistic model or precept, like the Monet and the De Chirico, it 
is creative, because it is valuable, skilfully made and original. This is a case of rules-
based creativity.
Using the philosophical language introduced in the studies of creativity by Margaret 
Boden,36 it can be said that the first kind of creative acts and products transforms a 
«conceptual space», i.e. a unified and organized cluster of ideas and techniques, which 
ruled a certain kind of activity (in this case: painting). In this sense, the Monet radically 
transformed the inherited generative principles of painting, because it overcome the 
constraints and conventions of previous organized systems of depiction, and established a 
new canon. As argued by Novitz,37 this is but one kind of creativity. Otherwise we could 
hardly consider the second kind of activities and product as creative. We can hardly consider 
the Renoir as creative or, choosing an example from the history of music, we could not 
value Mozart’s music as creative. For Mozart did not transformed a musical conceptual 
space, as later Schoenberg will do by inventing the dodecaphonic music. But to deny the 
creativity of Mozart’s music is odd, and obviously so. Therefore, we have to enhance the 
notion of creativity, allowing for kinds of creativity that do not deal with «problem solving» 
and transformations of «conceptual spaces», but rather with re-combinational activities in 
accordance with given rules. Recombinations can have valuable and surprising results. 
For instance, Mozart’s music is brilliant, to say the less, even if he «only elaborated and 
explored but never actually transformed the conceptual spaces that he had inherited from 
Joseph Haydn».38
We can conclude the following: All artworks that are creative in the sense 1) («revolutionary 
artworks» that set new rules for an artistic practice, transforming its «conceptual space») 
are also creative in sense 2) (creative following of given rules), and only some of the 
artworks that are creative in sense 2) are also «revolutionary artworks». The Monet and 
the De Chirico are creative in the first as well as in the second sense, while the Renoir is 
creative in the second sense. Yet the main point is that in artistic practices, artists owe their 
35 For this distinction set by Sibley see above § I.
36 M. Boden: The Creative Mind Myths and Mechanisms. Reading: Cardinal, 1992.
37 D. Novitz: «Creativity and constraints», Australasian Journal of Philosophy, n° 77:1, pp. 67-82.
38 Novitz: «Creativity and constraints», p. 77. According to Novitz, the exploration of complex conceptual spaces 
is not necessary for creativity. On the contrary, it «may on occasions inhibit rather than encourage human cre-
ativity» (Ibid., p. 76).
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creative achievements (including «revolutionary» ones) to the specific ways they cope with 
normative, aesthetic, technical constraints, by following the pre-compositional rules and the 
precepts of a certain artistic practice or genre (for example the precepts of pictorial realism, 
the canon of impressionism, the rules of a fugue, etc.) and/or the program idea as what to 
do (depicting a particular landscape in an expressive way, re-interpreting a well known 
symbolic image, playing on a certain tune…) and responding to the affordances of one or 
more media (oil on canvas, harmonic sound structures, video, etc.).39 All these elements – 
included the pre-compositional rules, the precepts and the idea, that, taken together, work 
as a kind of ‘recipe’ (a model) – are ‘ingredients’ artists use in order to tackle the task of 
artistic production. The interesting point is that artists do not have at their disposal a clear 
pre-established empirical routine to follow in order to produce their works. The ‘recipe’ 
must be accommodated within the other ‘ingredients’. Therefore, the recipe’s application 
suspends the recipe (= the model, the rule) and empirically instances another, unexpected, 
rule, which – as unprecedented as it was at the moment of the production of the artwork 
– seems to be specific for the single artwork. In this sense, as famously stated by Luigi 
Pareyson,40 creative artists invent the modalities of doing, i.e. the production rule, by doing, 
i.e. while producing the work. Consequently, one may argue, even if a) the artist follows 
technical rules and aesthetic precepts and even if b) the artwork may become exemplary for 
other artworks, the artwork’s specific empirical routine or production rule is creative only in 
the one single case. At the moment of the artwork production,41 the rule and its application 
cannot be distinguished, and the rule consequently collapses into the single artwork: it is, as 
it were, identical with it. A work following the very same empirical rule, using in the same 
way the ‘ingredients’ employed by a former creative artwork, will not be creative.
According to Pareyson, the rule is generated while generating the artwork, because the 
artwork conception and project are parts of the production of the individual work and they 
change, during the concrete making of the artwork, due to several factors: the empirical, 
material, situational, social conditions of the artistic work, the on-going process of self-
evaluation of the partial production outcomes, the recalcitrance and the suggestions of 
the medium etc. Consequently, the success of the artistic undertaking cannot be evaluated 
by comparing the artwork or the artistic event with a plan arranged in advance or merely 
judging the way it makes use of well known techniques and styles. The Renoir’s value is 
not only due to its following the ‘impressionistic rule’ or the ‘landscape rule’, but rather by 
the unprecedented, skilful and valuable ways it follows those rules. It is not determined by 
the compliance with a canon as a standard of success. For the specific standard of success, 
i.e. of the perfection of the work, is established by the success itself of the work, which 
becomes its own rule. This may sound circular. But the circularity at issue is a reflexive one.
As Berys Gaut recently observed, «to be creative requires one to exercise an evaluative 
ability of the relevant kind. (…) Possessing an evaluative ability is one of the constraints 
39 The artists themselves may invent the program idea and choose the artwork media; yet, independently from 
their creativity, they may also be asked by others, for example by a commissioner, to work on a certain idea in 
a particular medium. 
40 See L. Pareyson: Estetica. Teoria della formatività, Milano, Bompiani, 1988. See also G.E Yoos: «A Work of 
Art as a Standard of Itself», in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, n° 26, 1967, pp. 81-89.
41 This ‘moment’ is not an instant: it covers the time period of the work production, from ideation to exhibition.
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on the manner of making something that is essential to its being creative.»42 So the norm 
artists are guided by is the ideal of a ‘perfect’, creative, outcome, in virtue of which they 
are able to reflexively evaluate what they are doing, while doing it. They judge the results 
of their work while they are at work. This potentially continuous evaluation can result in a 
transformation of the evaluative aesthetic constraints that the artist accepted or established 
while planning or imagining the artwork. This ideal can prove to be right, i.e. creative, only 
if the real artwork generated under its guidance is valued and recognized as creative, while 
being judged, in retrospect, as the outcome of an action that followed a creative ideal plan, 
i.e. a plan that the artist was capable to evaluate and change accordingly to the specific 
situation(s) encountered during the production process. Hence, the evaluative ideal norm 
guiding the artist proves to be creative, only if it will motivate the production of a creative 
artwork, which, once produced, will be evaluated, by the producer as well as by the public, 
as really original and exemplary of creativity, and will maybe become a paradigmatic model 
for other artworks.43
At this regard, and especially in connection with the issue of improvisation, the media of 
production deserve particular attention. In the creative artistic process the materials used are 
not only elements that must be arranged in order to conform to a pre-determined contents 
and forms (ideas, meanings, feelings, pre-composition rules, in one word: the ‘recipe’). We 
have not, as it were, two things: the well carved stone, the coloured surface, the structured 
sounds or words on the one side and, on the other side, the contents expressed and the pre-
compositional forms. Artistic creativity does not work as a kind of translation of an already 
available content into a medium by means of following pre-established rules of production.44 
The achievement we value as creative in art is that specific arrangement of sounds, words, 
colours, physical movements etc. as manifesting that particular content, that could not 
exist otherwise.45 Hence, artistic creativity cannot be conceived (only) in terms of problem 
solving, i.e. as to how to adjust a medium to a previously shaped idea. The specific medium 
has an autonomous constitutive role in the making of the artistic product. It is not a ‘vehicle’ 
under the complete artists’ control. On the contrary, it gives artists impulses, sometimes 
surprising ones, that they should be able to grasp and that may lead them to variously modify, 
in a more or less experimental way, the initial idea as well as the forms and techniques used 
(the ‘recipe’), before achieving the final product. Hence, artists can experience tensions and 
surprises in responding evaluatively to their own works.46
At this point it may be useful to summarize the salient features of artistic creativity, 
before turning to improvisation.
42 B. Gaut: «Creativity and Rationality», Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, n° 70, 2012, pp. 259-270, here 
p. 67.
43 Thanks to Jerrold Levinson for pushing me on this point.
44 See G. Hagberg: «Against Creation as Translation», in G. Hagberg: Art as Language, Ithaca and London, 
Cornell University Press, 1995, pp. 109-117.
45 Cf. J. Dewey: Art as Experience (1934), NewYork: Pedigree, 1980, pp. 53-54, 68.
46 Cf. E. Huovinen: «On Attributing Artistic Creativity», in: A. Bertinetto, A. Martinengo (eds.): Re-thinking 
Creativity. Creativity between Art and Philosophy, pp. 65-86. Cf. Novitz: «Creativity and constraints».
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a) The creative artwork is unique, like the rule that it follows while being produced.
b) It is original, because it is to a great degree something new, unexpected, and 
somehow unpredictable. The precise outcome of an intentionally creative action 
can indeed hardly be determined in advance: creativity exceeds our skill to foresee 
the results of the fulfilment of a plan.47 It is nonetheless an appropriate and non-
accidental evaluative reaction to the circumstances of its production, in the context 
of which its originality can be stated. Therefore, artistic creativity can be judged only 
in retrospect.48 
c) Moreover the creative artwork is contingent, and its production involves the risk 
of failure, because nothing – no plan, no rule, no recipe – assures its success. (The 
process of its production is not automatic).
d) It is highly valuable, not in spite of, but exactly because its success is not sure and 
appears as a kind of favour.49 The perfection of the artwork cannot be judged, during 
the production of the artwork, by comparison with a model of perfection (i.e. with a 
canon or a rule). Indeed, the rule of the artwork production is singular to the extent 
that, at the moment of its production, it coincides with the artwork.
e) Finally, the artwork is unrepeatable and at the same time exemplary. It is unrepeatable 
because the empirical routine that led its production is creative only in the single 
case (a second case will be an imitative repetition), and it cannot be subsumed under 
a determining general rule.50 It is exemplary not only because it is the standard 
of production of similar artworks, as in the case of revolutionary artworks which 
become paradigmatic of a genre, but mainly because the way it is produced – with 
flair – invites others to produce artworks while skilfully producing the rules of 
their production (in this sense, not only Schoenberg’s, but also Mozart’s music is 
exemplary of creativity): other artworks can imitate the «operative efficiency of the 
rule», as a way of doing which is invented and evaluated in the course of the work-
production.51
For the reasons explained above, art creativity generally displays the way human beings 
act creatively in the context, and within the constraints, of their biological and social 
environment. Indeed it exemplifies the following. 1) Our actions are, on the one hand, 
embedded in social practices, natural situations and «conceptual spaces», which draw the 
lines at them, but, on the other hand, those practices, situations and «conceptual spaces» 
47 D. Sparti: Suoni inauditi, Bologna, il Mulino, 2005, p. 167.
48 M. Rampley: «Creativity», The British Journal of Aesthetics, n° 38, 1998, p. 276.
49 Cf. I. Kant: Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790; Eng. Transl. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000), § 5.
50 Yet, it may be objected that several artworks are ‘replications’ of the one creative idea embodied in a first art-
work that becomes the model of the following artistic production of a certain artist. The replications are appli-
cations of a creative innovation that do not contribute anymore to innovate the artistic field in a creative way. 
Pollock, for example, invented the drip painting and applied this same technique to several works. Nonetheless, 
as Ekki Huovinen observes, replications, like the several Pollocks, may be taken as genuine documents of cre-
ativity. However, this has not to do with the method of dripping as art-historical innovation, but rather with the 
way the artist «keep himself motivated to use this method in his continuing work», and continues to distinguish 
the good from the unsuccessful ones (Huovinen: «On Attributing Arstistic Creativity», p. 78).
51 Pareyson: Estetica, p. 141.
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are modified by the same actions they govern, limit and constrain. 2) The success of our 
actions is often not determined by general mechanical routines, because following rules may 
imply the invention of rules in the single cases. For this reason they can fail; conversely, it 
is for exactly this reason that they are so valuable if they succeed. However, their success 
is never guaranteed. In this sense art makes us aware of the insecurity of our life and, in 
so doing, help us to control the anxiety generated by this insecurity.52 At the same time, it 
shows how very valuable is a kind of acting and making that, while manifesting freedom 
in action, invents its own rules while acting – and is for that reason original and exemplary.
III. Improvisation
The practice of improvisation can teach us something about this issue. Art, I have argued, 
is an exemplification of creativity in general; artistic improvisation, I will now suggest, 
is an exemplification of art creativity. Improvisation is often regarded as anti-artistic in 
nature, due to its supposed unpreparedness, inaccuracy, and repetitive monotony. However, 
improvisation does not mean only an action accomplished (or the process of accomplishing 
something) without preparation, accuracy and variety. Improvisation is also, and more 
importantly, the ability of doing something freely, by means of following, changing, 
inventing, and evaluating the action’s rules in ways that are unexpected and surprising. In 
this sense, improvisation in an important feature of creativity. This holds true even in cases 
of non-improvisatory and non-real time creative production processes that require long 
investigations and corrections.
III.1. ‘Logic’ of improvisation
Improvisations in the arts are processes in which creation and performance coincide. They 
are a special kind of processes, in which the creative (inventive, ideational) activity and the 
performing activity occur at the same time, and are the one and same generative occurrence. 
Hence an improvisation is a process that unfolds while being invented. But we must be 
careful. We want to distinguish between artistic improvisations and other non-mechanical 
activities, which are all more or less improvisational, in this general sense. Indeed, skiing, 
for instance, like other sport practices and everyday activities (like driving a car), is 
improvisational, because it is somehow spontaneous, although it makes use of learned 
automatisms. Moreover, if improvisation is defined as a generative process not completed 
in a work that subsists temporally or logically before the execution of the performing act, 
the playing of every game, for example a chess game or a video game, is improvisational, 
in this sense. Nonetheless, not every process in which the doing outshines the ending is an 
improvisation in the proper sense. Differently from practices like skiing, playing chess or 
driving a car, by listening or attending to an artistic improvisation (in music or theatre, for 
instance) we do not only experience the process-like character of on-going and developing 
actions that are ephemeral, irreversible, unrepeatable events and that, in addition, may be 
creative in various ways (one may, for instance, invent a new skiing-technique just while 
52 Garroni: Creatività, p. 174.
130 Alessandro Bertinetto
Daímon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 57, 2012
skiing). We rather experience the unfolding of activities that are intentionally improvisational 
and creative, that is, we assist to the artists’ exhibition of the generation, in the course of 
performance, of artistic items or events that are intended to be offered as such to the aesthetic 
appreciation and/or critical assessment of an audience.53 In this sense, to perform a work of 
classical music, say a Beethoven’s symphony, by following the work’s indications, is not 
to improvise. In this case the generational process is closed before the performance of the 
work.54 On the contrary, in improvisation, the focus of attention is the exhibited process of 
inventing while performing. The performing and the inventing process intentionally coincide 
and are simultaneously presented to the audience.55
Improvisations are unrepeatable processes. They standardly do not result in works which 
can be executed over and over again and, in the cases of improvisational composition, 
as Davied Davies calls it,56 that is, in compositions that uses improvisation as means for 
the production of repeatable artworks, repetitions are not improvisations anymore. In 
improvisation, the goal of the artistic production and the target of the aesthetic attention is 
the dynamical activity of inventing while performing here and now. It is an event, which 
cannot be repeated, for the very simple reason that per definitionem the repetition of an 
improvisation is not an improvisation. Improvisation is the generation of something – 
music, theatrical performance, dance – which is intended to endure only the time of the 
performance. It comes and goes and is perceived during its being invented, i.e. in fieri. It 
arises, is developed, while being aesthetically experienced, and then it disappears (though 
it can be kept in memory or stored by audio-visual media). 
Unlike in composed works, in artistic improvisation the invention is performative and 
vice versa, the performance is creational. The creative process and its product occur at the 
same time.57 So the creational process is the target of aesthetic attention. Indeed if aesthetic 
attention is directed to the performing act, it is necessarily directed also to the creative 
process, due to the fact that the two processes are one.58 That is why the way in which 
53 Cf. A. Bertinetto: «Improvvisazione e formatività», Annuario filosofico, n° 25/2009, Mursia, 2010, pp. 145-
174, here pp. 145-147.
54 Nonetheless, good performers apply creatively the rule of the interpretation of the score. So, interpretation may 
be a creative process. And, unless the work is performed by a machine which follows an algorithm, one may say 
that, in this sense, every performance of a musical or dramatic artwork is creative and improvisational to some 
degree. However, we should avoid the risk to conflate improvisation and interpretation. I have dealt with this 
issue in reference to musical improvisation in A. Bertinetto: «Paganini Does Not Repeat. Musical Improvisation 
and the Type Token Ontology», Teorema, n° XXXI/3, 2012, pp. 105-126.
55 A case can be made for improvisation in non-performing arts. It seems that in non performing arts, like 
painting, architecture and sculpture, the product is the target of the aesthetic attention; moreover the distinction 
between creation and performance seems to be untenable. By arguing that improvisation is exemplary of 
artistic creativity as such, I implicitly suggest that we can solve this problem. An artwork of non-performing 
art is improvisational if, like in traditional Japanese painting, it is the outcome of a creational process, which 
occurred without interruptions, erasures, changes or corrections, and if the product is significant only by means 
of presenting itself as a manifestation of the unrepeatable process of its own production. However, here I cannot 
pursue this matter further.
56 D. Davies: Philosophy of the Performing Arts, Malden MA, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 150-160.
57 D. Sparti: Il corpo sonoro, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2007, p. 122.
58 Cf. R. K. Sawyer: «Improvisation and the Creative Process: Dewey, Collingwood, and the Aesthetics of Sponta-
neity», The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, n° 58, 2000: pp. 149-150; G. Hagberg: «Improvisation and 
ethical interaction», in: G. Hagberg (ed.): Art and Ethical Criticism, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell 2008, p. 259.
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an improvisational process will unfold is unforeseeable (improviso means properly: not 
foreseen) and surprising. Before being performed what will be performed is unknown and 
unknowable, because it will exist only through and thanks to the performance. Or better 
still: it is the performance. To summarize, improvisation can be defined as a process in 
which, intentionally, the invention is performed while 1. the performance is being invented, 
2. the performative invention is being simultaneously offered to the public, and 3. it is being 
evaluated by the performers as well as by the public. A subset of other properties ensues 
from the coincidence of creational and performing process.
a) Irreversibility: The creative process cannot be corrected after its end, as it were from 
the outside. Any correction of the creative process is part of the process.59
b) Situationality: Improvisation is a process that occurs here and now and vanishes while 
it is occurring.
c) Singularity: There are not and cannot be two identical improvisations. The identity 
of two or more improvisational events is logically ruled out, because their concrete 
spatiotemporal conditions are parts of their beings. Copies, imitations, repetitions are 
by definition not improvisations.60
d) Self-construction (autopoiesis) and self-reference. In an improvisation process the 
subsequent acts affect and implement the significance of those acts that have been 
performed before. In the course of the improvisation continual feedback loops occur, 
in virtue of which what has already happened becomes the interpretative frame of 
the following actions. The subsequent actions retrospectively affect the meaning of 
what is already performed, because they offer a new context for their interpretation.61 
Hence an improvisation is a self-referential and autopoietic event, because it is 
generated and unfolded, as it were, from the inside.62
III.2. Phenomenology of improvisation
The features I have just outlined provide us with a logical frame for the definition of 
art improvisation as such and show why improvisation exemplifies art creativity. In § II 
I argued that creative artists, though beginning with an idea or a plan in mind, invent the 
concrete modalities of producing the artwork, while producing the artwork, because «the 
artwork emerge[s] with and according to a plan it develops for itself only in the process 
of its creation».63 Artists’ creative achievements are unforeseeable before the artworks are 
59 One can give another direction to the process, but what is done is done. Erasures are not possible. Cf. G. 
Tomasi: «On the Spontaneity of Jazz Improvisation», in: M. Santi (ed.): Improvisation. Between Technique 
and Spontaneity, Cambridge, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2010, pp. 77-102, here p. 85. Anyway, during the 
unfolding of the performance, the meaning of what has been already performed may (even radically) change by 
virtue of what follows. The past events cannot be changed, but they may be differently interpreted due to a new 
situation (or through a different evaluation of the old situation) that re-orientates our interpretation of them.
60 Sparti: Il corpo sonoro, p. 133.
61 G. Hagberg: «Jazz Improvisation: A Mimetic Art?», Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 2006, pp. 469-485; 
D. Sparti: Suoni inauditi; E. Fischer-Lichte: Aesthetik des Performativen, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 2004.
62 In «Improvisation und Normativität», Georg Bertram elaborates on the normative aspects of this kind of self-
reference.
63 E. Landgraf: Improvisation as Art, London, Continuum, 2011, p. 79.
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produced, due, among other reasons, to the role played by the media they use. Improvised 
performances display these same traits, because in this case the creative process, the skilful 
and valuable invention of artistic items, is (presented as) the focus of aesthetic appreciation.
Empirically considered, however, no improvisation is really a creatio ex nihilo.64 Like 
the other outcomes of artistic creativity in general, improvisations are never realized, as it 
were, in the pure state. There is always a background upon which improvisation will take 
place.65 In an improvisation, pre-existing forms and shaped materials are worked out and 
re-shaped in new or different ways (are ‘interpreted’, ‘combined’, ‘transformed’). Explicit 
or implicit, conscious or unconscious rules, conventions, precepts, instructions, abilities, 
habits, styles, patterns guide the improvisational performing process, which anyway occurs 
not only in virtue of these contextual constraints, but also against and in spite of them. The 
self-constructed freely-spontaneous ‘internal’ context of improvisation unfolds itself in the 
frame of this already available and readymade (‘external’) context which ‘governs’ and at 
the same time ‘fuels’ the ‘inventing while performing and vice versa’ process that subverts 
these constraints while it inventively feeds itself with them.
Hence the improvisational event, like every artistic creation, should be thought of as 
dialectical. It lives in the tension between the routine and the new. Its occurrence results 
from the clash between contrary elements: preparation and invention, planning and surprise, 
structure and process, legality and spontaneity.66 The pure improvisational element is to be 
found in the second term of each of these oppositional concept-couples; but it can be realized 
empirically only through the encounter with its respective opposite.
Hence, improvised performances take place in and are dependent upon cultural practices. 
But they also transform and sometimes revolutionize the practices. And like the novelties 
introduced by creative artworks, in particular and rare cases improvised performances set 
new conventions, new rules, new codes for further performances. The creativity of art 
improvisation is in this sense a good combination of rule-based and rule-changing creativity. 
Improvisation depends upon both constitutive and regulative rules: i.e. rules that 
constitute a certain practice (for example, the practice of melodically and rhythmically 
extemporizing on established sets of chords) and rules that regulate the development of the 
practice (for example, the practice according to which every musician of the Quintet plays 
n-chorus long solos and at the end dialogues with the drummer in the break). However, by 
means of applying the rules, improvisers alter them – in certain ‘revolutionary’ cases not 
only the regulative, but also the constitutive ones –, to the extent that they set new rules for 
further performances, and in this way they may transform the practice that sustained them 
and that they contribute to carry on.
Moreover, and even more importantly, improvisation shows on the scene how rules 
are invented, followed, applied, transformed, rejected. For example, in a musical group 
64 Cf. L. B. Brown: «Musical Works, Improvisation, and the Principle of Continuity», Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, n° 54, 1996, pp. 353-369; L.B. Brown: «‘Feeling my way’: Jazz Improvisation and its Vicissi-
tudes – A Plea for Imperfection’», Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, n° 58, 2000, pp. 113-123; Tomasi: 
«On the Spontaneity of Jazz Improvisation».
65 Cf. C. Dahlhaus: «Was heißt Improvisation?», in: R. Brinkmann (ed.): Improvisation und neue Musik, Mainz-
London-New York-Tokio, Schott, 1979, 9-23.
66 T. Gustavsen: «The Dialectical Eroticism of Improvisation», in: Improvisation. Between technique and Sponta-
neity, pp. 7-51.
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improvisation, the performers begin with certain (maybe minimal) indications about what 
and how to play. For instance, they can decide to play a famous standard, My Funny Valentine, 
without stating the melody of the theme. Or they choose to avoid the reference to a standard 
or to sequences of chords and to follow only implicit conventions or indications based upon 
their musical practice and their reciprocal acquaintance, as in ‘free’ jazz. Anyway, whatever 
they play upon (a famous ballad, a sequence of chords, loose conventions), at a certain point, 
a somehow unexpected and unforeseeable empirical event – say, a syncopated rhythmic 
figure in 7/4 played by the bass – can be evaluated by the fellow performers in different 
ways. Each of these ways can direct the performance in very different, again somehow 
unexpected, directions. The pianist may accept the indication given by the bass and, also 
based on the many improvised performances they shared together, may choose to recognize 
it as exemplary of a rule to be followed. But he can also decide to ignore it, following his/her 
own previous ideas. Or he can modify the bassist’s indication, accepting the rhythmic idea, 
but rejecting the suggested speed. Let’s suppose that also the drummer follows the rhythmic 
pattern: then the feeling of the birth of a rule for the performance may be strengthened.67 
The rule is generated in virtue of the way a certain musical event, produced or not with 
the intention to instantiate and indicate a rule, is evaluated and recognized as creative of a 
rule and as exemplary of the rule it embodies and indicates. Hence, in improvisation self-
evaluations and evaluations by fellow performers, which are produced and communicated 
in the course of performance, have a performative meaning. They contribute to indicate 
a certain event as generative and as exemplary of a rule. So, the rule is generated on 
the spot, in previously unforeseeable ways, and, in the same way, may be later altered 
or dismissed. Hence, in the course of performance rules are multiply created, followed, 
applied, transformed and rejected, in a more or less unexpected and surprising way and in 
a more or less skilful, successful and satisfying manner. And, at the end, central features 
of the performance, maybe precisely that rhythmic pattern, can be taken as a paradigmatic 
prescription for further performances.68 
The ‘magic formula for success’ in the improvisational creative process is often to be 
found in the capacity to combine the following of rules given by traditional practices, styles, 
techniques, with the transformation of these rules, that, by means of skilfully mixing the 
expected and the unexpected, can lead to the invention, and the following, of a new rule, 
instanced in the unrepeatable, but exemplary, improvisational event.69 This mirrors how 
creativity can be experienced in everyday life and specifies how creativity is generally at 
work in art.
67 According to Novitz, in his Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Reiligious Belief 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1966, p. 5) Wittgenstein terms «feeling for the rules» the understanding of «the role that 
rules play within the ‘culture of a period’» (See Novitz: «Rules, Creativity and Pictures», p. 61.). I see no reason 
to deny that we can have a feeling for the specific rules that are being followed, and sometimes generated, in the 
course of interactive processes, like the ones occurring in artistic improvisation or in a conversation.
68 Cf. Bertram: «Kreativität und Normativität»; Bertram: «Improvisation und Normativität»; Brandom: «Freedom 
and Constraint by Norms»; A. Bertinetto: «Improvisation: Zwischen Experiment und Experimentalität?», in: 
Proceedings of the VIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Ästhetik (Experimentelle Ästhetik) (http://
www.dgae.de/kongress-akten-band-2.html), 2012. 
69 See Sparti: Suoni inauditi, pp. 191-194.
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IV. Improvisation as exemplary of creativity
Like ordinary interactions in our everyday life, art improvisational processes must react 
to unforeseeable situations and draw new action paths. In doing this they can be more or less 
traditional or innovative. Consequently they can be more or less safe or risky. So, though 
making something risky does not entail, per se, acting creatively, the contrary holds true. 
Creative process involves risks. 
In social, biological, and environmental situations that cannot be faced by applying 
tested patterns and techniques on must take the risk of trying something new. In artworks 
production and in artistic improvisation (but also in scientific and technological research) 
one may intentionally strive for creative achievements. In both cases, rejecting a well-
known pattern of actions (say a well-learned movement routine in skiing or a more common 
rhythmic figure in 4/4 in playing bass) and trying something new (a different technique 
or a surprising rhythm in 7/4), aiming at any improvement, enhances the risk of failure, 
because one does not know exactly the consequences of his/her actions: they may simply be 
bad, undesired consequences. Still, the new movement routine or the unexpected rhythmic 
may be creative, if, after having accepted and overcome the risk of failure, they succeed in 
making something valuable in a skilfully way.
Hence, it seems correct to say that who creates is forced to improvise. As I explained 
above, creativity is as such a risky endeavour, because the ‘recipe for creativity’, i.e. the 
recipe for producing original, valuable and skilfully made items, does not exist. One cannot 
predict in advance whether his/her innovations will succeed and will be inter-subjectively 
appraised. Hence, creativity involves a certain degree of improvisation and improvisation, 
in turn, is paradigmatic of the exposure to risks involved in creative endeavours in everyday 
actions and especially in art. Every improvisational process involves as such a certain 
risk, because its outcome is always somehow adventurous and unpredictable. In artistic 
improvisation performers take intentionally a special kind of risks – risks concerning the 
possible failure of an artistic representation: the bass player of the previous example risks in 
doing what he does, because he is not sure that the rhythmic figure he proposes will succeed 
and will be taken as a valuable rule to be followed. This kind of safe risk (that nonetheless 
may surely have real negative consequences for the artist’s life) shows how it is to act in 
risky situations. In this way, it shows as well that the ability to tackle risks is effectively part 
of the measure of success in everyday life as well as in the arts.
The readiness and the skill to take risks by undertaking problem finding-, rather than 
merely problem solving-, activities – those that invent the ways of acting while acting – are 
the core of artistic improvisation, because improvisers perform what they invent, without 
the possibility of correction. Like in the unfolding of the everyday life, corrections are 
part of what is being performed, i.e. of what is now occurring: this particular event, which 
is unrepeatable, thus unique and original, and which, if it is successful, is exemplary of 
creativity in action.
Therefore, artistic improvisation is paradigmatic for artistic creativity. This holds true 
not only in cases of improvisational compositions. It holds true even in case of artworks 
requiring long processes of incubation, refinement, and correction and of artworks resulting 
from manipulation of a medium in accordance with pre-compositionally fixed rules. As a 
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matter of fact creativity is improvisational, in the sense, explained above, that its outcomes 
are unforeseeable. They may take by surprise the beholders, but even the artist. For the 
artist is not simply following a ‘recipe’. The artist modifies (or even rejects) the ‘recipe’, 
accordingly to the concrete situation and the concrete media that afford his/her reactions, 
in a more or less exploratory and experimental way and uses it, as it were, as one of the 
‘ingredients’ of the artwork he is producing. Improvisers do the same in an explicit way. 
While reacting in real time to the concrete situation, they use – and, of course, they adapt 
and transform – ‘recipes’ of different kinds (sequence of chords, melodic formulas, songs, 
pattern of actions, dramatic plots, cultural conventions, aesthetic styles, performing tricks, 
etc.) as ‘ingredients’ of the improvised performance.
In sum, artistic improvisation may be understood as exemplification of artistic creativity 
in the Goodmanian sense of exemplification, according to which what a symbol exemplifies 
must apply to it.70 Improvisation is a symbol of artistic creativity in acto, that puts on the 
stage the characteristic features of creative behaviour.71 It displays creativity, as the invention 
of the ways of doing something, by and while doing that something in concrete situations 
and responding to the affordances of a medium. As Edgar Landgraf writes, «improvisation 
demonstrates how a work of art can emerge from a (…) process that creates original, 
unpredictable, and unforeseen works or performances that go beyond what the participants in 
the process could have planned or otherwise envisioned in advance».72 In improvisation the 
outcomes of creative endeavours are displayed while they are being thought out, i.e. while 
decisions are made about following, changing and inventing rules, and making something 
that turns out to be, at least partially, original, valuable and accomplished with flair. As 
artistic creativity at work, improvisation shows how artistic creativity unfolds by shaping and 
reshaping procedures, traditions, styles, genres; by following and inventing rules of acting; 
by failing and succeeding; by accomplishing fairly – if it succeeds – something unexpected, 
valuable, unrepeatable, and exemplary. It shows that – in art, as in life – failures and mistakes 
can be turned into chances for unpredictable, original and exemplary achievements, or they 
can remain simple failures and mistakes.73
70 N. Goodman: Languages of Art (1968), Indianapolis, Hackett, 1976, pp. 52-7.
71 Cf. Hagberg: «Jazz improvisation and ethical interaction», p. 259.
72 Landgraf: Improvisation as Art, p. 101.
73 This paper originated as a talk given at the XVI Colloquium 2010 in Evian, Art (12-17 July 2010), and, in a 
different version (which appeared with the title «Improvisation and Artistic Creativity in «Proceedings of the 
European Society for Aesthetics», vol. 3, 2011, pp. 81-103), at the 3th ESA Conference 2011 in Grenoble (April 
2011). For helpful discussion and comments on earlier drafts I thank all the participants and especially: Georg 
Bertram, Robin Celikates, Christoph Ladou, David Lauer, Élise Marrou, Maria José Alcaraz, Anke Haarmann, 
Claire Pagès, Íngrid Vendrell Ferran, David Nowell-Smith, Catrin Misselhorn, Alberto Frigo, Alberto Mar-
tinengo, Jennifer McMahon, Salvador Rubio Marco, and the students who attended the ‘Masterseminar’ Impro-
visation und Kreativität in menschlicher Praxis und Kunst (summer semester 2012, Institut für Philosophie der 
FU Berlin). Special gratitude to Jerrold Levinson, Paolo Calvino, Andrew Huddleston, Davide Sparti, and two 
anonymous referees. The mistakes in this paper are obviously mine, not theirs. I also thank the Spanish Ministry 
of Science and Innovation (research project FFI2011-23362) and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for 
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